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Abstract This paper focuses on risk perception amongst fishermen in four coun-
tries: the Faroe Islands, Greece, Iceland and the uk. The main question addressed 
is whether fishermen in the four countries perceive risk in a similar or diverse 
manner. In particular, risks associated with policy, management and control, 
fish stock health, economic factors and climate change are analysed. Data on risk 
perceptions were collected through a series of unstructured interviews based 
on an adapted version of the mental modelling methodology. The output of the 
interviews was analysed qualitatively and by using simple descriptive statistics. 
The key findings of this paper are that risks relating to policy, management and 
control are of most concern to fishermen, followed by economic factors and the 
impact of fishing on the environment. It was also apparent from these results 
that most of the risks cited by fishermen tend to be controlled by agents outside 
the fishing industry. This study contributes to the emerging theory of risk within 
the fishing sector and highlights the areas that need to be addressed by fisher-
ies managers to improve resource management. However, further analysis and 
research is required to fully comprehend risk perception among fishermen and 
other stakeholders in the marine environment.
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Introduction
Risk issues are complex, dynamic and characterised by uncertainty and conflict. 
This complexity is due partly to their multidimensional nature, with technical, 
economic, social, political, ethical, health and other factors involved in most in-
stances. In a paper by Macgill and Siu (2005:1108), who state that ‘it is impossible 
to identify a risk issue that nobody knows anything about’, risks are characterised 
as being multidimensional and ‘exist only by the virtue of the knowledge people 
have of them’. In most cases, risk involves both physical and social dimensions, so 
we share the definition given by Macgill and Siu (2005:1110) that risk is ‘the union 
of the dynamically evolving risk knowledge of the physical and social worlds’.
Risks associated with the fisheries sector can take many forms; for example, 
the risks of stock collapse, safety-at-sea, management failure, or exchange rate 
fluctuations. It is important to elicit the fisheries sector risk perceptions from a 
variety of viewpoints instead of merely relying on those provided using formal 
quantitative methods as carried out by scientists, for example when determining 
the likelihood of stock collapse or recovery that may result from various policy 
options. Fishermen are obviously central to the fishing activity and they in turn 
base their decisions on information (and associated risk perceptions) from a 
number of sources including management regulations, economic conditions, 
and operational factors. In writing about perceptions of risk by scientists and the 
general public, Slovic (1987:285) wrote that:
Perhaps the most important message from this research is that there is 
wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and perceptions. Lay people 
sometimes lack certain information about hazards. However, their basic 
conceptualisation of risk is much richer than that of experts and reflects le-
gitimate concerns that are typically omitted from expert risk assessments.
A failure to consider risk perceptions held by stakeholders in the fisheries sector 
can undermine government actions aimed at managing or accommodating risks 
to the sector. In particular, risks related to the sustainability of natural resources 
and the fishing community need to be better understood to ensure management 
measures adequately protect fisheries and the fishing industry. It is argued in 
this paper that risk perception of European fishermen is shaped by various social, 
political and economic forces. In order to increase communication between stake-
holders in the fishing industry, and better manage natural resources, it is vital to 
understand how fishermen comprehend risks in their industry.
The research and results presented in this paper seek to elicit risk 
perception amongst fishermen in four countries. The four countries chosen 
for analysis are the Faroe Islands, Greece, Iceland and the uk. The basis of this 
selection is the contrasting scales and nature of the fisheries found in each 
country and the differing management structures and social contexts. The paper 
employs the Grounded Theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967), in order to 
develop concepts and patterns directly from data, and does so to identify the key 
elements of risk perceptions among European fishermen. The main objectives 
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for the research presented in this paper are: 1) to identify the risk perceptions of 
fishermen in each country; 2) present these risks by simple statistical and cluster 
analysis; and finally; 3) develop hypotheses from the emerging patterns of risk 
perceptions.
The research adopted a social science approach to the identification of 
risks by assuming that people differ in their perception and evaluation processes 
(de Camprieu, Desbiens and Feixue 2007). Data were collated through a series of 
unstructured interviews based around an adapted version of the mental modelling 
methodology put forward by Bostrom (2003). Results are analysed qualitatively 
and by using simple descriptive statistics.
This research was conducted under the European Union-funded research 
project prone.1 This paper deals only with risk perception among fishermen. For 
analysis of risk perception among other groups of stakeholders in the fishing 
industry of the four countries selected see Tingley et al. (2008).
This is one of the first known attempts to collect and analyse data on 
risk perception of fishermen operating in different countries and to adopt a 
social sciences approach. Our research is unique due to the comparative aspects 
of fishermen operating in four European countries with different fisheries 
management systems.
The next section reviews the theory relating to risk perception research. 
Section three outlines the research methodology employed. Results are presented 
in section four and the paper ends with a discussion of the results in respect of the 
overarching research objectives where some conclusions are presented.
Literature Review and Theory
General Theories of Risk
The basic assumption of the social sciences is that a risk event or hazard can mean 
different things to different people and that these perceptions are also context and 
culturally dependent (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006). In most cases risk involves 
both social and physical dimensions. The physical dimensions include factors 
such as ecological threats, transport accidents, and stigmatisation of local areas, 
whereas social dimensions refer to determinants of people’s judgement about risk 
acceptability (Macgill and Siu 2005).
Social scientists have shown differences in risk perceptions among 
technical experts, the general public, ethnic and other social groups, and between 
individual and group preferences (Slovic and Weber 2002). Sjöberg (2002) notes, 
for instance, that experts tend to assign lower estimates to risks which fall within 
their own area of expertise and responsibility, in comparison to the public, 
suggesting that the level of responsibility felt by experts about a risk is the driving 
factor for these differences, as compared to the level of knowledge. Pidgeon et 
al (1992) conclude that experts are often overconfident in the exactness of their 
estimates. Activities are perceived as being more risky if the people or agencies 
managing them are perceived as untrustworthy. Also, information from trusted 
sources is given more weight than that from untrusted sources. Taylor-Goodby 
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and Zinn (2006) point out that if the ‘non-expert’ perception of the strength of 
uncertainty, or threat caused by a risk differs from that of the objective scientific 
or ‘expert’ community, this is neither irrational nor uninformed.
Many external factors have been shown to affect how people sense risks. 
For instance, Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein (1979) came to the conclusion that 
cognitive limitations cause uncertainty to be denied and risks to be distorted, 
and that risk is influenced by the imaginability and memorability of the hazard. 
Expert risk perceptions corresponded closely to statistical frequencies of death, 
while three factors were found to be particularly important in influencing lay 
people’s acceptance of risk: factors known as uncommon risks, risks that are 
unknown, and the number of people potentially affected. People have been 
found to overestimate risks which score highly in terms of these properties and 
underestimate those they are more familiar with. Risk characteristics have also 
been found, for example, a ‘dread risk’ (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 1979) is 
seen to be linked with characteristics relating to degree of control of the risk by the 
individual. Dread risks are also potentially catastrophic or have fatal consequences, 
are irreversible, are involuntary and are inequitably distributed. ‘Unknown risks’ 
(Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein 1979) have been linked to the characteristics of 
not being known at all, including to science. Similarly, Otway and von Winterfeldt 
(1982) listed a series of eleven general negative attributes which were found to 
influence perception and acceptance of risks: involuntary exposure of risk and 
lack of control over outcomes means that people have negative attitudes to risk, 
and the same goes for uncertainty about likelihood and lack of experience with 
risk (that is, the fear of the unknown). The authors also list threat to future 
generations; infrequent but catastrophic accidents; benefits not highly visible; 
benefits go to others (inequality); difficulty in imagining exposure to the risk; 
effects of exposure in delayed time; and accidents caused by human failure rather 
than natural causes.
Relative power also appears to be an important dimension of context that 
influences perceptions of risk. Tierney (1999) finds that political and economic 
power determines the ability to impose risks on others, shape public discourse 
about risks, sponsor and conduct research that presents risk in particular ways 
and lobby for particular positions on the acceptability of risk. She also highlights 
the sociological view that risk is a dynamic concept and so human activity and 
social change constantly act to modify individual, group and society levels of risk 
vulnerability.
Based on the above discussion, we therefore hypothesize that perception of 
risk tends to increase when fishermen do not have control over a risk factor and 
when the risk is involuntary, unknown, human-based, and relates to untrusted 
agents. Moreover, fishermen’s relative political and economic power will change 
their sense of risk.
Research Related to Risk in Fishing
In this section we present research that focuses on fishing related risks. Two 
main research streams were identified: risk and fisheries management systems 
and dangers relating to the fishers’ occupation. At the end of the section we con-
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nect this work on risk in fisheries with the general findings on risk presented in 
the previous section as a basis to assess the potential risk perceptions to emerge 
among European fishermen.
Previous research has shown that fisheries management systems affect 
the organisation of the fishing industry in various ways. First, we note the impact 
of fisheries management systems on the behaviour of fishermen. Especially 
pertinent to our case studies are Individual Transferable Quota (itqs) and input 
restriction systems. Individual Transferable Quotas (itqs) are generally thought 
to encourage fishermen to better match existing capacity and effort levels with 
current and future itq holdings in an economically rational manner. Thus they 
are encouraged to adjust their activities, by engendering a sense of responsibility 
towards ensuring long-run sustainability, rather than sacrificing long run yields 
for short run economic profits. However, itqs have also been criticized for a variety 
of reasons such as initial allocation problems and windfall gains, consolidation 
and employment issues affecting vulnerable communities, increased propensity 
to discard, loss of smaller boats, and high quota prices (Minnegal and Dwyer 
2008; Copes 1986).
Input restriction systems tend to be prone to overexploitation as a function 
of their lack of well defined property rights over the fishery resource. As each 
individual fisher is unable to prevent other fishers from taking their share of the 
catch the incentive is to take as much of the catch as possible (Charles 2001). As 
a consequence, fishermen tend to compensate for restricted inputs by increasing 
landings (Campell 1991) and to invest in more productive fishing technology often 
referred to as ‘technological creep’ (Marchal et al. 2007).
The complexity of fisheries management systems is the second aspect 
in relation to fishing, creating uncertainty and ambiguity in the industry that 
undermines the management of such systems. Accordingly, Garcia and Charles 
(2008) identify many features of the fisheries system which contribute to its unique 
complexity, such as the fundamentally limited and complex nature of renewable 
resources; exceptionally high levels of unobservability due to our inability to 
view fish in the sea; high levels of complexity due to multiple-species and fishing 
sectors, and strong political and economic drive due to high societal interest in 
ocean systems and high volumes of international fish trade. This complexity can 
cause losses in understanding, predictability, and management of the system, and 
the authors suggest changes to adapt new emerging relations between science, 
policy-making and society within complex fishery systems. In a similar manner, 
Degnbol and McCay (2006) discuss how a failure to understand linkages in the 
fisheries system can lead to management strategies that fail to achieve their 
objectives. They stress the need to recognise links between institutions involved 
in the production and evaluation of knowledge, on the one hand, and institutions 
which make management decisions, as well as being involved in fisheries 
implementation framework and adaptation, on the other. Finally, Pontecorvo and 
Schrank (2006) focus on the poor record of fisheries management. They argue 
that in a competitive industry like fisheries, the main objective is to maximize 
profits, or harvest, within a very short time frame. Consequently, catch limitations 
are seen as a threat to income. Unless the Total Allowable Catches (tacs) are based 
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on convincing scientific advice, the stakeholders in the industry will take any step 
they can to increase them. When these steps are successful, overfishing results. 
Pontecorvo and Schrank claim that overfishing is a structural problem involving 
knowledge limitations of fisheries science and the organisation of the fishing 
industry. In order to save the existing wild marine fisheries, they propose a more 
conservationist fisheries policy based on small scale fishing.
Fishermen tend to respond to the constraints of fisheries management 
systems by diversification according to Minnegal and Dwyer (2008). In their 
study of locally-based commercial fishers in Victoria, Australia, they found that 
fishers utilise diversification, such as multiple targets as manifested in a variety 
of fishing areas, vessels and markets. Such techniques help them manage risks 
in the biological and economic environments they experience. These measures 
have contributed to the numerical stability of the local fleet, at a time when most 
fishing fleets are in decline in the surrounding areas. This has even counteracted 
the main purpose of most fisheries management systems, which is to decrease 
the numbers of vessels. An implication of these findings is that the ways fishers 
manage risk offer lessons for fisheries managers as to why their policies fail and 
how they could be more successful.
Fishing is statistically a dangerous occupation. Pollnac, Poggie, and Cabral 
(1998) argue that the literature supports the proposition that fishers manifest the 
characteristics of an active, adventurous, aggressive, and courageous personality. 
Individuals with these characteristics would tend to minimize the perception 
of danger. Furthermore, they belong to a subculture that values bravery and 
fearlessness, which may also influence their perception of risk and danger. In 
a study of the New England fishery Pollnac et al. (1998) found that all fishers 
show great concern with grave danger such as falling overboard, explosions, and 
collisions at sea. However, the more experienced fishermen, and those fishing 
further offshore, did not express the same severity in perceptions of these risks.
Roberts (1992) noted that fishermen operate in a unique and dangerous 
situation and have to deal with weather-related hazards combined with economic 
pressures; the industry can be unreceptive to the introduction of safety measures. 
Poor (or equally high) prices can encourage fishers to take risks to maximise trip 
value. These risks can involve risky behaviour (for example fishing in dangerous 
conditions), but can also involve risky strategies (for example landing black market 
fish). Personal safety appears not to be a priority for fishermen (Törner and Eklöf 
2000) who tend to see safety protection as costly.
Based on the above discussion we therefore hypothesize that complex 
fisheries management systems will impose various risks on fishermen, such as 
restricting access to fishing, or enabling other fishermen to snatch their share. 
This tends to give rise to economic concerns. Knowledge limitations of fisheries 
science combined with our inability to view the fish in the sea can also pose 
some risks, as the unknown tends to increase risks, and as imperfect scientific 
knowledge tends to escalate conflicts between the fishing industry and regulators 
over catch size and restrictions on fishing. This can mean that activities are seen 
as more risky because they are managed by untrustworthy agents. Fishermen 
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tend to manage such risks by fighting fisheries restrictions, by diversifying, and 
by neglecting the risks associated to with their dangerous occupation.
Methodology
This research was based on a series of qualitative, unstructured interviews and 
utilised an adapted version of the ‘mental modelling’ approach. Mental Modelling 
is a qualitative analysis technique used by social scientists, cognitive psycholo-
gists and decision-making theorists. It is used to explain an individual’s thought 
process in relation to how something works in the real world and seeks to examine 
how people construct accounts of reality (Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006; Johnson-
Laird 2004; Vasquez, Regens and Gunter 2006). The Mental Modelling interview 
process was developed to elicit interviewee perceptions of risk and the strength 
of these risk perceptions in relation to the fisheries sector. The methodology was 
also designed to capture explanatory information in relation to perceived linkages 
between risk factors, for example ranking, weighting and direction of linkages.
A series of unstructured face-to-face interviews were carried out in 2007 
in Faroe Islands, Greece, Iceland and the uk with a variety of fisheries sector 
stakeholder groups relevant to the case study fisheries. Interviewees were initially 
presented with a sheet of paper with empty bubbles (referred to here as Mental 
Model 1: Blank model). They were then asked to fill in as many of the bubbles as 
appropriate with a separate risk issue in each bubble that they felt was of relevance 
to the fisheries sector. The interviewer did not influence the interviewee or make 
any suggestions as to what people may perceive as a risk in the fisheries sector. 
Interviewees were also asked to rank their risks numerically (for example from 
1 to n depending on number of risks identified) and to assign a weight to each risk, 
using the scale 0.1 to 1.0, with 1.0 being the highest possible weight representing 
the most serious risk. By definition, a weight of 0.3 represents three times more 
risk than 0.1. The interviewer recorded the reasons why the interviewees ranked 
risks in the way they did and also noted any linkages between risks by drawing 
lines and arrows between bubbles. Weights and arrow heads could also be assigned 
to the lines to show the strength of these linkages and their respective direction.
Following the completion of the Blank model, interviewees were shown 
what the authors term the ‘Comprehensive model’ (Mental Model 2). The 
comprehensive model was based on the results of pilot surveys undertaken 
in each Case Study Country in 2006. Whilst the range of perceived risks for 
fishermen was expected to vary between countries, it was thought appropriate 
to construct one ‘Comprehensive model’, for use in all countries, to allow for 
cross-country comparison. The variables in the comprehensive model were not 
linked or ranked, so as not to influence the interviewee’s response in any way. 
A Comprehensive model was created for each stakeholder group in the original 
research, that is inshore and offshore fishermen, fishing industry representatives, 
governments and regulators, consumers, ngos and scientists (only findings 
related to the fishermen are presented in this paper). See Figure 1 for an example 
of a Comprehensive model for inshore fishermen.
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Figure 1: Mental Model 2: Comprehensive model. Example of inshore fishermen
 
Safety of vessels Pollution Law enforcement
Illegal 
fishermen
Administration
problems
Fishing
costs
Climate change Reduced fishing
areas
Conflict with sport
fishermen
After being shown the Comprehensive model, interviewees were asked if they 
wished to revise the model they constructed previously, termed Mental Model 1: 
Blank model. The interviewees were asked why they chose to add (or to omit) risks 
that had been included in the Comprehensive model.
To recapitulate: The interview process was unstructured. The interviewees 
were presented with only background information of the prone project and the 
aim of the interviews. They were then shown the blank Mental Model-sheet and 
asked to identify risks, their severity (on the scale 0.1-1.0) and how they interrelated. 
The only role of the interviewer was to facilitate the mental modelling process 
outlined above.
In total, interviews were carried out with seventy-two fishermen (ten 
in the Faroes, thirteen in Iceland, twenty-five in the uk, and twentyfour in 
Greece). Relatively few fishermen were interviewed in some cases; therefore any 
generalisation of results should be treated with caution. The depth and qualitative 
nature of the interviews, however, yielded a rich data-set and the small samples 
should be viewed in the context of a much larger number of country-specific 
interviews which took place with a range of other fishing sector stakeholders, the 
results of which are reported in full in (Tingley et al. 2008).
In all countries, a mixture of prior fishing sector knowledge, key contacts 
and established networks was used to pre-select interviewees and the snow-
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balling technique (Churchill 2002) was employed to identify subsequent interview 
candidates. All fishermen interviewed were male.
Results
Key risks identified
In this section the key risks identified by fishermen in the Faroes, Greece, Iceland 
and the uk are presented in descriptive and tabular format. The number of risks 
identified varied between groups and between countries. Table 1 summarises the 
individual risks reported by the fishermen interviewed. A total of thirty-seven dif-
ferent risks were identified by respondents in all countries. Faroese, Icelandic and 
Greek fishermen identified fifteen distinct risks while uk fishermen identified 
fourteen. Among those risks, high fishing cost and the availability of experienced 
crew are common for all countries. Finally, eight risks are shared by at least two 
countries. The table indicates that the fishermen in the four European countries 
have divergent risk perceptions, and there is little agreement regarding the sever-
ity of risks identified. It should be noted also that in-group variations tend to be 
quite high.
Faroese Fishermen
The Faroese fishermen’s perception of risks is mainly focused on four categories 
of risks: poor management of the fishery by the state; stock declines, fishing costs 
and climate change. All the interviewed fishermen mentioned poor government 
management and administration as a risk and ranked it highly. The main concern 
identified in the interviews was not regarding the effort-based system or the ef-
fect the system has on the stocks, but rather state management of the effort-based 
system. In other words, concerns regarding the poor use of fisheries management 
tools. The fishermen were concerned on the one hand with the politicians allow-
ing too much fishing effort (too many days at sea) and, on the other hand, politi-
cians not being able to reduce illegal fishing activity and illegal by-catch by the 
pelagic trawlers, which in the fishermen’s opinion has devastating consequences 
for the stocks of cod, haddock and saithe.2
Stock decline was considered to be caused by illegal by-catch, overfishing, 
disruptions to the food chain resulting in a shortage of food for fish, illegal 
fisheries and effort restrictions set too low. The increased cost of fishing due to 
high oil and increasing gear prices was also identified by Faroese fishermen, and 
trawler fishermen in particular, because of its severe impact on profitability. Some 
of the fishermen also showed concern for the problem of obtaining appropriate 
fishing crew. In addition, Faroese fishermen referred to pollution, environmental 
legislation and lobby groups and climate change as risks, although the severity of 
these risks was considered much lower than the risks listed above. It is of interest 
that Faroese fishermen did not mention the state of scientific knowledge regarding 
stock size, stock reduction and other biological parameters as a risk.
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Greek Fishermen
The risks identified by Greek fishermen can be grouped into four main catego-
ries: Economic factors, conflict with other sectors, stock reductions, and legislative 
and political factors. The Greek fishermen ranked fishing cost as their number 
one risk. Conflict with sport fishing and aquaculture was mentioned as a risk 
by inshore fishermen, while offshore fishermen identified conflicts between pro-
fessional fishermen. This relates to disagreements among coastal, trawler, purse 
seiner and shore seiner fishermen on issues like illegal fisheries and the operation 
of industrial vessels close to the coast and within the fishing grounds of coastal 
fishermen.
Many Greek fishermen expressed significant concern about the fisheries 
management system in general. Most interviewees mentioned issues relating to 
the application of legislation, too much paperwork, problems with the Ministry 
of Agriculture Development and Food and managers not being fully aware of the 
problems faced by the fisheries sector.
Most of the fishermen in Greece indicated apprehension about the 
reduction of stocks, and some mentioned pollution. Some also noted safety at 
sea and the problem of finding experienced seamen. The latter is related to the 
high proportion of foreign workers, and the high labour turnover among domestic 
workers. As with the Faroese fishermen, it is noteworthy that Greek fishermen do 
not see the state of scientific knowledge as a major risk.
Icelandic Fishermen
Fishermen in Iceland identified four categories of risks: Quota reduction and 
fisheries management, cost of fishing, working conditions and climate change. 
Almost all fishermen mentioned the impact of political decisions within the fish-
eries management system on total allowable catch (tac) as a strong risk to their 
industry. Just before the interview process began the Icelandic government had 
decided to cut cod quotas by thirty percent which may have been one of the rea-
sons this particular risk ranked so high relative to others. Cost is also a significant 
factor, operational and financing cost in particular, and the exchange rate between 
the fluctuating Icelandic currency and foreign currencies was also singled out as a 
specific risk in itself, affecting the financial well-being of the fishermen.
Science or state of knowledge is also a significant risk factor, as the reduc-
tion in quotas is based on scientific advice. Fishermen gave scientific knowledge 
a fairly high priority as a risk factor. This relates both to disagreement within the 
research community, and the disparity between scientific knowledge and fisher-
men’s experience as regards the sustainability of the fishing stocks.
The fishermen mentioned many aspects related to the working environ-
ment, such as safety at sea, harsh weather, and obtaining an appropriate crew. The 
difficulty in obtaining skilled seamen is a risk factor that is directly and indirectly 
linked to many other risks. The crew have to handle all aspects of life while out 
at sea and they must trust each other with their lives. Morale onboard is funda-
mental to the well-being of the fishermen. Finally, the fishermen tend to speak of 
oceanic change rather than climate change. They detect positive effects of ocean 
warming, but the uncertainty involved was often the risk cited.
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uk Fishermen
The most important risks identified by British fishermen related to concerns 
about ineffective fisheries management, the potential threat of reduced fishing 
areas due to the expected creation of Marine Protected Areas, and increased costs 
of fishing. These attitudes are not unexpected given the state of the cod fisheries 
management system in 2007 (Tingley et al. 2008), the increasing level of (current 
and potential) encroachment on traditional fishing grounds as concerns from en-
vironmental organisations and the economic climate at the time, particularly high 
fuel prices.
Fishing for quota species is heavily controlled under the Common Fisheries 
Policy and there is widespread discontent with a number of features of the current 
quota management system, including the scientific and information process. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of interviewees mentioned risks 
relating to the catch quota management system – particularly quota shortages.
The potential for reduced fishing areas, as a result of current and potential 
wind farm development is also perceived to represent a risk. The uk’s east coast 
already has a number of offshore wind farms and many more are currently being 
proposed in the area. There has also been a high profile public debate in the uk 
in recent years about securing future energy supplies with a particular emphasis 
on renewable sources. The east coast is also the site of much of the uk’s marine 
aggregate dredging, so again it is not surprising that inshore fishermen in this 
area are highly aware of the perceived constraints and effects on their fishing 
activity from other industries and are concerned about potential future impacts.
Concerns about the risk from fishing costs were cited by the majority of 
interviewees – particularly in relation to fuel expenses – although some tempered 
their concerns noting that good market prices in 2007 were helping to ease 
the financial impact of the risk from increased costs. It is to be expected that 
economic factors such as expenditure and crew shortages feature prominently in 
a risk register of this type given the current economic climate. Operational factors 
such as safety at sea were only mentioned by few respondents and the severity of 
risk ranked low.
Cluster Analysis
In order to further analyse the data, and to increase the comparability of results, 
the research group classified the various risks identified by fishermen and other 
stakeholders into eight clusters of related risks. These are: 1) economic factors, 
such as cost of fishing, market price, oil price, exchange rate, et cetera; 2) prevailing 
environmental conditions, for example, climate change, bad weather, and effects 
of pollution on stocks; 3) conflicts with non-fisheries sector stakeholders using (or 
with interest in) marine resources, such as environmental organisations, reduced 
fishing areas and so on; 4) working environment and conditions, primarily safety 
at sea; 5) policy, management and control, consisting of ineffective fisheries man-
agement, lack of scientific knowledge, law enforcement, quota availability, illegal 
fisheries, et cetera; 6) conflict between political priorities; 7) conflicts within the 
fisheries sector and; 8) impact of fishing on natural environment and resources, 
that is, stock declines, overfishing, habitat damage, et cetera.
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It is possible to categorise risk in a variety of ways, for example in terms 
of who has control over it (for example autonomous agent, dependent agent). 
However the categorisation method chosen in this analysis represents an attempt 
to partition risks with respect to the fisheries sector according to whether they are 
driven by, or arise as a result of, drivers from outside of the fisheries sector (and 
therefore generally outside of its control, for example, as represented by categories 
1, 2, 3 and 4) or whether they arise from factors generally within the control of 
some part of the fisheries sector (for example, government/regulators [categories 
5 and 6] or fishermen [7]). Finally category 8 represents the risk from the fishing 
activity itself on the natural environment and its resources which also should 
arguably come under the control or influence of both government/regulators and 
fishermen to some extent.
Table 2 shows that policy, management and control risks were the most 
frequently cited risks amongst fishermen in all countries. Economic-related risks 
were joint second in Greece and Iceland, whereas the impact of fishing on the 
marine environment and fish resources came second in the Faroes and conflict 
with non-fisheries sector marine stakeholders was cited second in the uk.
Table 2: Risks identified by fishermen
Faroes Iceland Greece UK
Academic risk duster 
grouping
Number 
of 
citattions %
Number 
of 
citattions %
Number 
of 
citattions %
Number 
of 
citattions %
Conflicts between 
political priorities
2 2.9 1 0.74 0 0.0 1 1.1
Conflicts with non-
fisheries sector marine 
stakeholders
7 10.0 12 8.89 4 1.7 20 21.5
Conflicts within 
fisheries sector
2 2.9 1 0.74 13 5.4 1 1.1
Economic factors 13 18.6 37 27.41 46 19.1 19 20.4
Impact of fishing on 
natural environment 
and resources
14 20.0 9 6.67 32 13.3 11 11.8
Policy, management 
and control
22 31.4 40 29.63 94 39.0 32 34.4
Prevailing 
environment 
conditions
9 12.9 17 12.59 26 10.8 7 7.5
Working environment 1 1.4 18 13.33 26 10.8 2 2.2
70 100.0 135 100.0 241 100.0 93 100.0
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Figure 2: Major risk categories identified by fishermen based on the impact of the risk (scalar 
values raging from 0.1-1.0.3
When the major risk categories of Figure 2 are analysed according to the impact 
of the risk as given by the fishermen in scalar values, we notice some national dif-
ferences. It can be seen that the impact of fishing on natural resources was given 
a high value in the Faroese (0.78), but only a low value (0.23) in the uk. Similarly, 
Faroese fishermen rank economic, market and trade risk as low (0.4) compared 
to other fishermen (0.6-0.66). Fishermen from all countries rate the risk related 
to policy, management and control above 0.5, with Icelandic fishermen rating it 
highest at 0.72.
An analysis of the nature of the risks mentioned above supports the theory 
that fishermen perceive risks to be primarily driven by actors outside the fishing 
sector. This is the case for economic and market factors, and to a large extent 
with regard to policy, management and control. The category of fishing impact on 
the environment is, on the other hand, under the control of both regulators and 
fishermen to some extent.
It is clear from these findings that many social, political and economic 
factors impose risk on the daily operations of European fishermen. Common 
factors are the fisheries management system affecting access to fishing grounds, 
economic struggles, and concerns about whether there are enough fish in the sea. 
Also, some national characteristics, such as type of fishing, fishing technology, 
natural conditions, and, most importantly, fisheries management systems, seem 
to have lasting impact on the perception of risk in the fishing industry. With 
regard to fisheries management systems, two countries in our case study – Iceland 
and the uk – have itq systems, while the Faroese use a fishing days system, and 
Greece has no limitation on the magnitude of fishing, except for tuna. Simply 
put, Iceland and the uk restrict the total catch each vessel can land per year, while 
the other two countries allow fishermen to catch what they land. This difference 
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seems to have an impact on the perception of risk as Icelandic and uk fishermen 
are more concerned about policy, management and control risks than fishermen 
from the other countries. Fishermen from the Faroe Islands and Greece are more 
concerned about the impact of fishing on natural resources. However, given the 
small sample size, and thus limited number of observations, the results of this 
study should be used with caution. However, this is one of the first attempts to 
apply such risk research to the fishing industry and consequently further research 
is required to validate the results presented here.
Discussion
This paper has focused on risk perception amongst fishermen in four countries: 
the Faroe Islands, Greece, Iceland and the uk. The main question addressed was 
whether fishermen in the four countries perceive risk in similar or divergent 
manner. We hypothesized, first, that perception of risk tends to increase when 
fishermen do not have control over the risk, the risk is involuntary, unknown, 
human-based, and/or relates to untrusted agents. Moreover, relative political and 
economic power of actors largely outside the fishery will influence risk for fisher-
men. Secondly, complex fisheries management systems will impose various risks 
on fishermen, who are inclined to manage such risks by fighting restrictions on 
fishing, diversifying their activities, and by tending to neglect the risks associated 
with their dangerous occupation.
The main findings of this paper are that 1) fishermen in the four countries 
have divergent risk perceptions and 2) where similar risks were identified between 
countries, the severity of these risks was often perceived quite differently. In line 
with this latter finding, the average score (from 0.1 to 1) given to each risk also 
varies between countries. The risks identified were, poor management by the 
state, the cost of fishing, stock declines, overfishing, illegal fishing, safety at sea, 
climate change, conflict with sport fishing, conflict with aquaculture, reduced 
quotas, exchange rates fluctuations, obtaining appropriate fishing crews, and 
the state of scientific knowledge. When these risks were grouped into clusters 
of related risks, policy, management and control risks were most frequently 
cited amongst fishermen in all countries. Economic-related risks, the impact of 
fishing on the marine environment and fish resources, and conflicts with other 
stakeholders were also often cited.
Policy, management and control risks affect the total amount of catch in 
most countries. Government decisions regarding total allowable catch or effort are 
based on scientific advice and the final decision is a political one in the hands of 
Ministers of Fisheries. It is, therefore, no surprise that fishermen consider such 
decisions, which have a great impact on their economic and social well-being, 
as high risks. The same goes for economic risks which considerably affect the 
net return of earnings and profit in the fishing industry. These findings further 
strengthen the argument of Garcia and Charles (2008) where they state that the 
unobservability of the fish in the sea, multiple-species interaction, and strong 
political and economic drive in ocean systems makes fisheries management 
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difficult to implement, to say the least. Our conclusions indicate that as a result of 
special circumstances in the fishing sector scientific findings in themselves come 
to be regarded as a risk for fishermen; hence, scientific advice tends to be met 
with scepticism and even as an untrusted source. This is in accordance with the 
findings of Pidegon et al. (1992).
Our findings are similar to the conclusions of Slovic and Weber (2002) and 
Otway and von Winterfeldt (1982) stating that involuntary exposure to risk and 
lack of control of outcomes tend to increase risk perception. A cluster analysis of 
the risks identified by fishermen in our study indicates that risks most prominent 
to fishermen are primarily driven by actors outside the fishing sector. This is also 
the case for economic and market factors, and to a large extent true of policy, 
management and control. The category fishing impact on environment is, on the 
other hand, under the control of both regulators and fishermen to some extent, 
and such risks were given low values. The same applies to working conditions, 
which are ranked low by the fishermen in the study. This is probably due to the 
fact that this risk is to a large extent under their own control, and they belong to a 
subculture that values bravery and fearlessness (Roberts 1992; Pollnac et al. 1998). 
Moreover, the ever more complex fishing management systems in most countries 
seem to impose more risks on fishermen relating to such factors as lack of 
control over the fishing grounds, involuntary risks, and lack of knowledge. Many 
fishermen in the study expressed their concern about ever diminishing access 
to fishing due to political decisions and green lobbying. They also complained 
about negative debate in the media. These points confirm the findings of Tierney 
(1999) on how political and economic power can give the ability to impose risks 
on others, shape public discourse about risks, sponsor and conduct research 
that presents risk in particular ways, and lobbies for particular positions on the 
acceptability of risk.
 It is interesting to note that fishermen in Greece and the Faroe islands 
are more concerned about the impact of fishing on the environment and natural 
resources than fishermen in Iceland and the uk. The latter groups are, however, 
more concerned about the state of scientific knowledge and its input into policy 
formulation than fishermen in Greece and the Faroe Islands. This may well be 
an effect of the different fisheries management systems in these countries as 
suggested by Minnegal and Dwyer (2008) and Marchal et al. (2007).
Further analysis and research is needed to fully comprehend risk percep-
tion among fishermen. What is, for example, the impact of different fisheries 
management systems on risk perception and behaviour among fishermen? What 
role does trust have in the effective operation of different fisheries management 
systems? And finally, how can risk perception of fishermen be incorporated into 
the fisheries management system in order to improve risk communication and 
the operation of such systems?
One objective of this research is to develop hypotheses from the patterns 
of risk perceptions identified in the research process. The following hypotheses 
are put forward so that future research can improve our understanding of risk 
perception in fishing and further secure sustainable fishing.
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H1: Fisheries management systems and political decision making processes 
have a great impact on risk perception among fishermen
H2: Economic matters have an impact on risk perception among fishermen.
H3: Fishermen operating under open access or total allowable effort management 
systems are more concerned about fishing impact on the marine environ-
ment than fishermen operation under other systems.
H4: Fishermen operating under fisheries management systems where scientific 
advice is the basis of total allowable catch decisions tend to view the state of 
knowledge of fishing species as a risk.
Conclusion
Our study contributes to the emerging theory of risk within the fishing industry. 
Our findings indicate, firstly, that fisheries management systems impose vari-
ous kinds of risk on fishermen, such as 1) how often and how much the fishers 
can fish; 2) which groups can fish in which oceans, often causing conflict be-
tween various groups of fishermen (small and large scale, of different nationality 
et cetera); 3) the total allowable catch available in each country; and 4) the state of 
scientific knowledge that stock estimates are based on. Secondly, economic fac-
tors impose risk on fishermen, particularly: 1) exchange rate between countries; 
2) oil price and fishing gear cost; 3) investments in fishing boats and quota; and 
3) market prices. Thirdly, there seem to be a national differences in risks related to 
the impact of fishing on the natural environment. Here we notice that fishermen 
in open access fisheries or fisheries where input restrictions do not impose maxi-
mum catch limits, such as fishing day systems, are more concerned about risks 
related to stock reduction, overfishing and habitat damage, whereas fishermen 
in itq systems barely mention such risks. Fourthly, fishermen tend to underesti-
mate risks related to safety at sea, although operations on the open sea are usually 
very dangerous. We hope that our findings will encourage others to explore the 
dynamics between national conditions and the risk perception of fishermen and 
stimulate dialogue among all parties with an interest in the marine environment.
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Notes
1 Precautionary risk methodology in fisheries.
2 All of which are important commercial species in the Faroe Islands.
3 The figure shows average scalar values. It has been noted that there was great inter-group 
variation in each country, and the number of observations is quite limited. The results 
should, therefore, be interpreted with caution.
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